Felxible Exchange Rates in the Short Run by Rudiger Dornbusch & Paul Krugman
RUDIGER  DORNBUSCH 
Massachusetts  Institute  of Technology 
PAUL  KRUGMAN 
Massachusetts  Institute  of Technology 
Flexible  Exchange 
Rates  in  the  Short  Run 
CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY in exchange rates has marked the seven- 
ties. A  series of events, starting  with the appreciation  of the deutsche 
mark  in 1969, and including  the realignment  in the Smithsonian  Agree- 
ment in 1971 and a second realignment,  have brought  the world into a 
period  of controlled  flexibility  of rates.  Flexible  rates  were  the mechanism 
economists  had long advocated  for attaining  external  balance,' but the 
experience  in the last few years  has led many  to reconsider  it. 
That  reconsideration  is stimulated  by some  surprises  in the performance 
of flexible  rates. First among  these are the recurrent,  large cycles in ex- 
Note:  We are indebted  to Pedro Aspe, Roger Hankin, and Jay Helms for valuable 
assistance. Helpful comments from Karl Brunner,  Jerry A. Hausman, and members 
of the Brookings  panel are gratefully acknowledged.  Financial support  was provided 
by a grant  from the Ford Foundation. 
1. The literature on flexible rates goes back to Milton Friedman, "The Case for 
Flexible Exchange Rates," in his Essays in Positive Economics (University of Chi- 
cago Press, 1953).  Subsequent writing includes Egon Sohmen, Flexible Exchange 
Rates: Theory and Controversy (University of  Chicago Press, 1961); Richard E. 
Caves, "Flexible Exchange Rates," American Economic  Review, vol.  53  (May 
1963),  pp.  120-29;  Harry G. Johnson, "The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates, 
1969," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Review, vol. 51 (June 1969), pp. 12-24; 
Herbert Giersch, "On the  Desirable Degree  of  Flexibility of  Exchange Rates," 
Weltwirtschaftliches  Archiv, vol.  109, no. 2  (1973),  pp. 191-213; Edward Tower 
and Thomas D.  Willett, The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas and Exchange- 
Rate Flexibility, Special Papers in International Economics 11 (Princeton Univer- 
sity, International Finance Section,  1976);  and Richard N.  Cooper, "Monetary 
Theory and Policy  in  an Open Economy," Scandinavian Journal of  Economics, 
vol. 78, no. 2 (1976),  pp. 146-63. 
537 538  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1976 
change  rates.  The dollar-mark  rate,  for example,  fluctuated  more  than 10 
percent  in less than six months, though there was no comparable  dis- 
crepancy  in the movement  of price  levels. 
Both the fluctuations  in rates  and  their  side effects  soon caused  govern- 
ments to adopt exchange-rate  targets and to intervene  in the market. 
Governments  realized that exchange-rate  movements  had real effects: 
they altered  relative  prices  and real incomes  and they caused  inflation  or 
could serve to reduce inflationary  pressure.  Exchange-rate  targets  were 
also an attractive  alternative  to the discipline  of external  balance  imposed 
by a flexible  rate, which  was far from appropriate  in face of the real dis- 
turbances  of 1973-74.  Confronted  with a transitory  decline in real in- 
come, policymakers  much preferred  using reserves  and borrowing  to a 
free adjustment  of exchange  rates. 
The worldwide  recession  of 1974-76 demonstrated,  with the benefit  of 
hindsight,  that even under flexible rates there is scope for coordinated 
stabilization  policy. A coordinated  expansion  in economic  activity  would 
have allowed every country  to experience  some export-led  recovery  at 
stable  exchange  rates. 
Against  this background,  we propose  another  look at flexible  rates  and 
ask how they fit into conventional  macroeconomic  thinking.  The paper 
seeks primarily  to pull together  existing knowledge,  factual and theo- 
retical.  The  focus  is entirely  on the short  run. 
We are concerned  with two related  questions:  How are exchange  rates 
determined,  and what role do they play in a short-run  macroeconomic 
context?  The answers  are developed  in part  from  theory  and in part  from 
empirical  evidence. The next major section covers theory, from pur- 
chasing  power  parity  and the Keynesian  model.  The theory  of purchasing 
power parity emphasizes  the relation  between price levels and the ex- 
change  rate but is not a theory  of exchange-rate  determination  and has 
little to say about  the macroeconomic  role of exchange  rates. Keynesian 
theory,  by contrast,  places the exchange  rate in the center  of macroeco- 
nomics. The exchange  rate is identified  with the relative  price of goods 
and thus is a determinant  of the allocation  of world spending  between 
domestic  and foreign goods. Under conditions  of capital mobility  there 
is an important  link between  international  interest  rates  and  the exchange 
rate. 
The Keynesian  model  serves  as a starting  point  for a realistic  model  but 
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exchange-rate  expectations,  both as part of the adjustment  process and 
as an independent  source  of macroeconomic  disturbances.  The model is 
further  extended  by a look at the impact  of relative  prices  on the saving 
rate.  It is argued  that an exchange-rate  movement  changes  relative  prices, 
or the terms  of trade, and therefore  changes  real income.  The change  in 
real income,  in turn,  may alter  saving  and spending  at an unchanged  level 
of output.  The first  section  ends with a discussion  of capital  mobility  and 
the suggestion  that exchange  rates are determined  in asset markets.  We 
conclude that asset-market  views and balance-of-payments  views of 
exchange-rate  determination  differ little provided proper emphasis is 
placed  on the capital  account  in the latter. 
The model that emerges  emphasizes  the link between  interest  rates  and 
exchange  rates, identifies  the exchange  rate with the terms  of trade,  and 
assumes  that movements  in exchange  rates will bring  about adjustments 
in the composition  of world  demand.  The second  section  presents  empiri- 
cal evidence  on some of these issues. First, we find that exchange  rates 
indeed  have a strong  impact  on relative  prices.  A depreciation  will raise 
import  prices  relative  to export  prices,  and  thus  improve  a country's  com- 
petitiveness.  For the case of manufactures,  a country's  share  in world  ex- 
ports is significantly  determined  by its relative price position, but the 
adjustment  takes several  years. We also find that, given domestic  labor 
cost, competitors'  prices are an important  determinant  of export  prices, 
thus contradicting  the simple  Keynesian  model.  However,  this response  is 
only partial,  thus leaving  some terms-of-trade  effect. 
In the third  section,  we find that import  prices  have an important  im- 
pact on domestic  consumer  prices-an  effect  that  is not considered  in the 
simple Keynesian  model. Also, that section combines  the important  fea- 
tures  of exchange-rate  movements  in a short-run  macroeconomic  context. 
It draws on the Keynesian  model in emphasizing  the relation  between 
interest  rates  and exchange  rates  and the impact  of exchange  rates  on im- 
port prices.  It goes beyond the Keynesian  model in emphasizing  the ad- 
verse  short-run  effects  of expansionary  monetary  policies.  The exchange- 
rate  depreciation  that  is induced  will only slowly  affect  the composition  of 
demand;  it will immediately  raise import  prices and thereby  consumer 
prices.  It follows that, given flexible  rates and capital  mobility,  countries 
that seek an expansion  in aggregate  demand  face an adverse  inflation- 
unemployment  tradeoff. The exchange-rate  adjustment  speeds up the 
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conditions,  an individual  country  will want  to use a monetary-fiscal  policy 
mix and  that, during  a worldwide  recession,  there  is a compelling  case for 
coordinated  expansion.  These policy considerations  are taken up in the 
fourth  and  final  section. 
Theory  of Flexible  Exchange  Rates 
This section provides  an overview  of the main approaches  to flexible 
exchange rates and lays out the elements of an integrated  approach. 
Traditionally,  there  have been three quite  different  views of the role and 
determination  of exchange  rates.  A monetary  approach  developed  in the 
wake of the experience  after  World  War  I holds that domestic  monetary 
upheaval  will be reflected  in external  depreciation.  A second strand  of 
an'alysis,  again originating  in the twenties,  emphasizes  relations  between 
relative  price levels and the exchange  rate-the  famous  doctrine  of pur- 
chasing  power  parity (PPP). Finally, Keynesian  macroeconomics  of the 
open economy  under  flexible  rates was developed  in the late forties  and 
elaborated  in the sixties and stresses  the interaction  of output and ex- 
change-rate  determination. 
PRICES  AND  EXCHANGE  RATES 
Under  the skin of any international  economist  lies a deep-seated  belief 
in some  variant  of the PPP theory  of the exchange  rate.2  According  to the 
law of one price,  a commodity  should  sell for the same  price (freight  and 
duties  apart) in various  locations.  An exchange  rate  that leaves an inter- 
national  price discrepancy  will soon lead to arbitrage  and thereby  to an 
adjustment  in prices or the exchange  rate or both. Given enough time, 
therefore,  the domestic  prices of internationally  traded  goods will corre- 
spond  to world  prices  converted  at the going  exchange  rate. 
Even if the arbitrage  of traded-goods  prices is generally  accepted,  a 
number  of substantive  issues  remain.  Does spatial  arbitrage  have any  fur- 
ther implications  for exchange  rates, and, specifically,  does it imply  that 
2.  The theory and applications of PPP have been extensively reviewed in Law- 
rence H.  Officer, "The Purchasing-Power-Parity  Theory of  Exchange Rates:  A 
Review Article," International  Monetary Fund, Stagl  Papers, vol. 23 (March 1976), 
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exchange  rates  are a function  of price levels?  Given  domestic  and  foreign 
price levels, does the doctrine  assert  that the exchange  rate will attain  a 
particular  level? 
If all goods  were  traded  with  no transport  costs or duties  and  with  iden- 
tical  weights  in the price  index,  the law  of one  price  would  ensure  arbitrage 
of price  levels, as well as of individual  commodity  prices.  Obviously,  the 
departures  from these assumptions  are sufficiently  pronounced  that this 
result  should not be expected.  One alternative  is to consider  the relative 
movement  of price levels and exchange  rates  over  time. Here it is argued 
that movements  in the exchange  rate will offset those in relative  prices. 
This approach  will be primarily  correct  for the case of pure monetary 
disturbances  that leave the relative  price structure  within a country  un- 
affected,  but can be seriously  incorrect  as a general  proposition  about 
actual  or equilibrium  exchange  rates, as Samuelson  has emphasized.3  In 
an  important  contribution,  Balassa  has  pointed  out  that  the growth  process 
is likely to change  relative  price levels systematically.4  With  productivity 
growth  concentrated  in the traded-goods  sector,  the resulting  increase  in 
labor  cost to the service  sector  will raise  home-goods  prices  and  hence  the 
overall  price  level in the faster-growing  country  relative  to the rest of the 
world. 
The main points of PPP theory  can be formalized  by reference  to the 
following  equation:5 
(1)  e =  W-  )  +  (w*-w)  +  (  _0*). 
Equation 1 summarizes  the determinants  of exchange  rates on the as- 
sumption  that prices of traded goods are fully arbitraged.  Under these 
conditions the domestic currency  will depreciate  if domestic nominal 
3. Paul A. Samuelson, "Theoretical  Notes on Trade Problems,"  Review of Eco- 
nomics and Statistics,  vol. 46 (May 1964), pp. 145-54. 
4.  Bela Balassa, "The Purchasing-Power  Parity Doctrine: A Reappraisal,"  Jour- 
nal of Political Economy, vol. 72 (December 1964), pp. 584-96. 
5.  In equation 1 an asterisk denotes the foreign country, and e is the domestic- 
currency  prices of foreign exchange. Assuming full arbitrage  of traded-goods  prices, 
PT  =  ePT, or e =  PTIP*,  which corresponds to the absolute version of  PPP. Next 
we assume a relation between traded-goods  prices and the price level in each country, 
PT =  oP and PT =  o*P* and use the definition  of the real wage w =  W/P and w* - 
W*/P*  to form the expression e =  PTIPT  =  (l/o*)  (W/W*) (w*/W).  Equation 1 
is the logarithmic derivative of  this equation. For further comments see Rudiger 
Dornbusch, "The Theory of Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes and Macroeconomic 
Policy," Scandinavian  Journal of Economics, vol. 78, no. 2 (1976),  pp. 255-75. 542  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
wages rise faster than foreign money wages; if foreign real wages rise 
faster  than domestic  real wages;  or if the ratio of traded-goods  prices to 
home-goods  prices  rises  faster  domestically  than  abroad. 
The first  term  of equation  1 represents  the pure  inflation  effect  or mon- 
etary effect. With an unchanged  real structure  the country  experiencing 
the higher  rate of wage inflation  will have a depreciating  exchange  rate. 
The second  term  shows  the impact  of real changes.  More rapid  increases 
in real wages (stemming  from extraordinary  productivity  growth) are 
reflected  in an appreciation  in the currency.  The last term  in equation  1 
concentrates  on changes  in the relative-price  structure.  An increase  in the 
relative  price of traded  goods, given  real and money  wages,  implies  a de- 
preciation  of the currency. 
Equation  1 is a convenient  representation  of the influences  on exchange 
rates.  Even so it is not entirely  satisfactory  because  of two strong  assump- 
tions built into the formulation  that are not supported  by empirical  evi- 
dence for the short  run. First, the only variation  in relative  prices  is that 
between  home goods and traded  goods; the terms  of trade are constant. 
Second,  the law of one  price  actually  holds. 
A more  important  objection  to a formulation  such as equation  1 is that 
it implies a line of causation  from wages and the real structure  to the 
exchange  rate. Such a view disregards  the interaction  between  exchange 
rates and  prices.  PPP is at best an equilibrium  relation  between  exchange 
rates  and prices,  not a theory  of the exchange  rate. 
Nonetheless, one would expect a large part of exchange-rate  move- 
ments  to be accounted  for by divergent  trends  in prices (W -  W*) and 
in productivity growth (w  -_ w).  To put it differently, the proper ap- 
proach  may be to explain  the discrepancies  from equation  1 rather  than 
express  surprise  at a tendency  for the law of one price  to operate. 
KEYNESIAN  ANALYSIS  OF  FLEXIBLE  RATES 
Work on flexible rates in a macroeconomic  perspective  goes back to 
Polak, and Laursen  and Metzler,  as well as James  Meade.6  The analysis 
6.  Jacques J. Polak, "European  Exchange Depreciation in the Early Twenties," 
Econometrica, vol. 11 (April 1943), pp. 151-62; J. E. Meade, The Balance of Pay- 
ments (Oxford University Press, 1951); and Svend Laursen and Lloyd A. Metzler, 
"Flexible Exchange Rates and the Theory of Employment,"  Review of Economics 
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draws  flexible  rates into a macroeconomic  framework  by identifying  the 
exchange  rate  with  the terms  of trade,  which  in turn  affect  the composition 
of domestic  spending  and are a determinant  of exports.  Given  the interest 
rate and  the (fixed) level of domestic  prices,  a depreciation  raises  import 
prices and-assuming  appropriate  restrictions on  elasticities-shifts 
world  demand  toward  domestic  goods and  improves  the balance  of trade. 
In the absence  of capital  flows the exchange  rate will adjust  to main- 
tain the trade  balance  in equilibrium.  An expansionary  domestic  policy, 
for example,  would  raise  income  and  import  spending.  The  resulting  trade 
deficit  would cause a depreciation  and switch demand  toward  domestic 
goods until the deficit  was eliminated.  For this simple  case, flexible  rates 
make expansionary  policies operate  exactly as they do in a closed econ- 
omy. Since the trade  balance  is maintained  in equilibrium  by exchange- 
rate adjustment,  the economy,  in effect,  is closed for the purposes  of in- 
come  determination. 
The analysis  becomes considerably  more interesting  when it includes 
capital  mobility and interaction  between countries  in the determination 
of macroeconomic  equilibrium,  following the theories of Mundell and 
Fleming.7  The notion of capital  mobility  is best captured  by the extreme 
assumption  that domestic and foreign securities  are perfect substitutes. 
Abstracting  from exchange-rate  expectations,  this implies  that domestic 
and foreign  interest  rates are the same. That link has very strong  impli- 
cations  for monetary  and  fiscal  policy  under  flexible  rates. 
The two-country  model with perfect  capital  mobility  is depicted  in the 
diagram  below. The equations  are  those  for monetary  equilibrium  in each 
country (standard  LM equations) and for equilibrium  conditions  in the 
goods  market.  In the goods  market,  prices  are  fixed  in each country's  cur- 
rency and the supply of output is perfectly  elastic. The demand  for a 
country's  output  is equal  to that country's  expenditure  plus the trade  sur- 
plus or net exports.  The trade surplus,  in turn, is a function  of the ex- 
change  rate-the  relative  price  of goods or the terms  of trade-as  well as 
of both countries'  incomes. The model is completed  by the requirement 
that  interest  rates  be the same  in the two countries. 
In the diagram  the AA schedule  depicts  the combinations  of income 
7.  See Robert A.  Mundell, International Economics (Macmillan, 1968), chaps. 
11, 17, and 18, and J. Marcus Fleming, "Domestic Financial Policies Under Fixed 
and Under Floating Exchange Rates," International Monetary Fund, Stafl Papers, 
vol. 9 (November 1962), pp. 369-79. levels that  yield  monetary  equilibrium  and  equality  of interest  rates.  Given 
the money supply,  an increase  in home income will raise equilibrium  in- 
terest  rates. To maintain  international  equality  of interest  rates, foreign 
income would  have to rise along with domestic  income.  The slope of the 
AA schedule  is positive  (the essential  result) while  its magnitude  depends 
on relative  income  and interest  elasticities  at home and abroad.8 
The WW schedule,  which expresses  equilibrium  in the two countries' 
goods and money markets,  is generated  by alternative  exchange  rates, 
given  money  supplies  and  fiscal  policy.  For any  point  on the schedule  and 
an assumed  depreciation  of the domestic  currency,  the implied  increase 
in the relative  price  of foreign  goods will shift  world  demand  toward  do- 
mestic  output.  To meet the resulting  excess demand,  domestic  output  will 
have to rise while foreign output will decline. The magnitude  of the 
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8. The equations corresponding  to the schedules are the following. Solving the 
money-market (LM)  equilibrium for  interest rates as  functions of  income and 
money:  r = r(y,M)  and  r* -r*(y*,M*).  Along  the  AA  schedule  F(y,M)- 
T*(y*,M*),  where M and M* are the domestic and foreign money supplies. The 
WW  schedule  represents  equilibrium  in  the  goods  market:  y =  A (r,y,y) + 
T(y,y*,e)  and y  -=A*(r*  ,y*,y*) -eT(y,y*,e),  where A  and A*  represent do- 
mestic and foreign absorption  in terms of the respective  countries'  goods. The terms 
y and y* represent fiscal policy, and T is the trade surplus. The WW schedule is 
generated by considering alternative exchange rates and finding the corresponding 
equilibrium  levels of output. In the neighborhood  of the initial equilibrium  the trade 
balance is assumed zero. We assume, without much justification,  that import spend- 
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income  changes  depends  on marginal  propensities  and  interest  elasticities. 
The schedule  is negatively  sloped. 
A movement  up and to the left along the WW schedule corresponds 
to a progressive  depreciation  of the home country's  currency,  or a pro- 
gressive  worsening  of the home country's  terms of trade. Accordingly, 
the movement  induces  a growing  trade  surplus  that supports  the expan- 
sion in income.  The same point can be made so as to emphasize  the ab- 
sorption  approach.  A movement  to the left along WW implies  that do- 
mestic  income  and  interest  rates  rise.  With  a marginal  propensity  to spend 
that is less than unity  and with spending  further  dampened  by the higher 
interest  rate, income  rises  relative to spending  and  thus the home country 
has an external  surplus.  Precisely  the opposite argument  holds for the 
foreign  country. 
Initial equilibrium  obtains at point A. Given money supplies  in each 
country  and fiscal  policy at point A, the exchange  rate, the interest  rate, 
and income levels are such that goods and money markets  clear in each 
country. At A,  interest rates are equalized as required  under perfect 
capital  mobility. 
Consider  now a fiscal expansion  at home. At the initial  exchange  rate 
the expansion  in demand  will raise domestic  income. Accordingly,  the 
WW schedule  shifts up to W'W'.  In the short run, the fiscal expansion 
will raise income at home and raise interest  rates relative  to those pre- 
vailing abroad. The differential  in interest  rates will tend to induce a 
capital inflow that causes the home currency  to appreciate.  This appre- 
ciation  shifts demand  toward  foreign  output,  thus dampening  the income 
expansion  at home and spurring  an expansion  abroad.  The process  con- 
tinues  until  point  C is reached.  At C the fiscal  expansion  at home  will have 
caused income and interest rates to rise in both countries.  Therefore, 
under  perfect  capital  mobility,  fiscal  expansion-or  any autonomous  ex- 
pansion  in aggregate  demand-raises equilibrium  income everywhere  in 
the world. 
A critical  link in the transmission  of fiscal  expansion  to the rest of the 
world is the appreciation  of the expanding  country's  currency.  This may 
appear  paradoxical:  clearly,  the initial effect  of the expansion  must  be a 
worsening  of that country's  trade balance, which might point toward 
depreciation,  not appreciation.  The explanation  is that the assumption  of 
perfect  capital  mobility  ensures  that,  with  income  and  interest  rates  rising, 
the capital inflow will be potentially  infinite and, hence, the capital- 546  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1976 
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account  surplus  will dominate  any trade  deficit  and force an appreciation 
of the currency. 
What  can be said about  the new equilibrium  at point  C?  The expanding 
country  will have a trade deficit and will experience  an actual capital 
inflow.  The argument  can be made simply  by reference  to the absorption 
approach  and consideration  of the foreign  country.  Abroad,  income  has 
risen (from  A to C) and has pulled  up interest  rates.  With  a foreign  pro- 
pensity  to spend  that  is less than  one and  with  spending  further  dampened 
by higher  interest  rates,  foreign  income  will have  risen  relative  to spending 
and thus the foreign  country  will enjoy an improvement  in the trade  bal- 
ance  and  an actual  capital  outflow.  Indeed,  the change  in the trade  balance 
is the channel  through  which a fiscal expansion  in one country  is trans- 
lated  into an income  expansion  abroad. 
One of the very strong  predictions  of the Mundell-Fleming  model con- 
cerns a monetary  expansion  in one country.  The model implies  that in- 
come will rise in the country  where  the money  supply  increases  and that 
income will fall abroad.  The accompanying  diagram  is helpful  in under- 
standing  that adjustment  process. The increase  in money would lower 
domestic  interest  rates  and,  therefore,  generate  a potential  capital  outflow. 
The resulting  currency  depreciation  shifts  demand  toward  domestic  goods 
and causes an income expansion.  The income expansion  boosts interest 
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goods, output declines and so do interest  rates. By this process a new 
equilibrium  occurs  at point B, where  interest  rates  are equalized  again  at 
a lower  level, domestic  income  has risen,  and  foreign  income  has declined. 
The home country's  currency  has depreciated  and the trade  balance  has 
improved  so that  there  is an actual  capital  outflow. 
Again, the absorption  approach  helps to explain  the trade  balance  and 
the direction  of actual capital flows. With perfect capital mobility, do- 
mestic  and foreign  securities  carry  the same yield. Thus capital  flows are 
determined  by spending  and saving decisions,  not by interest  rates. At 
point  B, interest  rates  have declined  and income  has fallen  for the foreign 
country.  The declines  both of interest  rates  and of income  raise spending 
relative to income,  given a spending  propensity  of less than  one. Accord- 
ingly, at point B, the foreign  country  has a trade deficit  and therefore  is 
borrowing  in the world market.  The home country  is lending or experi- 
encing  a capital  outflow. 
The second  diagram  showed  that  a domestic  monetary  expansion  lowers 
income  abroad.  The next question  concerns  appropriate  offsetting  policies 
by the foreign  country  that would leave foreign  income  unchanged  while 
attaining  the domestic  target.  What policy combination  would produce 
result  C rather  than  B? Clearly,  a monetary  expansion  by the home coun- 
try  must  be supplemented  by both  monetary  and  fiscal  expansions  abroad. 
The monetary  expansion  abroad  raises  the foreign  country's  income and 
lowers the home country's.  The fiscal expansion  raises income in both. 
A combination  of the two will result  in a move  from  B to C. 
Two interesting  further  results  emerge  in the context  of these offsetting 
policies. First, perhaps  surprisingly,  it does not matter which country 
provides  the fiscal expansion.  If the home country  provides  it, domestic 
interest  rates will tend to rise, leading  to an appreciation  of its currency 
and a shift in demand  abroad.  The converse  will be true if the foreign 
country  provides  it. In general,  fiscal expansion  is shared  out to the rest 
of the world. 
Second, and also perhaps  surprisingly,  the trade-balance  effect of the 
combined  policies that expand  income  in one country  while maintaining 
it in the other  involves  a shift  toward  surplus  by the expanding  country. 
From the Mundell-Fleming  model we retain the general  proposition 
that foreign  monetary  or fiscal disturbances  are transmitted  internation- 
ally. Offsetting  these disturbances  requires active monetary or fiscal 
policy. While a monetary-fiscal  policy mix can maintain  the level of out- 548  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
put, it cannot  maintain  the composition between domestic  demand  and 
net exports,  nor can it maintain  the exchange  rate and  therefore  the terms 
of trade.  There  is perhaps  nothing  surprising  about  the result  that foreign 
real disturbances-including  changes  in money-have  a domestic  effect, 
but these facts certainly  stand  in sharp  contrast  to a popular,  unqualified 
belief that flexible  rates  insulate  a country  from  external  shocks. 
EXCHANGE-RATE  EXPECTATIONS  AND  CAPITAL  FLOWS 
The Mundell-Fleming  approach  to macroeconomics  under  flexible  rates 
emphasizes  interdependence  and capital  mobility.  Capital  mobility  takes 
on even more  significance  when we introduce  exchange-rate  expectations 
and their impact on macroeconomic  activity.9  To formalize  exchange- 
rate expectations,  assume again a world of perfect capital mobility so 
that  net yields on domestic  and foreign  debt are equalized.  Assume,  con- 
trary  to Mundell-Fleming,  that exchange-rate  expectations  are adaptive, 
possibly  with  a disturbance  term. 
Investors  will equate  net yields on domestic  and foreign  assets: 
(2)  r=r*+  , 
where domestic  and foreign  interest  rates are r and r*, respectively,  and 
the premium  or the expected future exchange  rate as a fraction  of the 
spot rate  is X.  Equation  2 states  that  investors  have  to be compensated  for 
an anticipated  depreciation  of domestic  currency  (X > 0)  by a commen- 
surately  higher  interest  rate. If expectations  are formed adaptively,  the 
expected premium,  X, is a function of current  and past exchange  rates 
(e, el,...)  and a disturbance term, u: 
(3)  X=X(e,  e1,  .,  u). 
Incorporating  equations  2 and 3 in the Mundell-Fleming  model permits 
consideration  of speculative  disturbances  and the resulting  adjustment 
9.  The role of exchange-rate  expectations in a macroeconomic context has been 
emphasized by Robert A. Mundell, "The Exchange Rate Margins and Economic 
Policy," in J. Carter Murphy, ed., Money in the International Order (Southern 
Methodist University Press, 1964); Victor Argy and Michael G. Porter, "The For- 
ward Exchange Market and the Effects of  Domestic and External Disturbances 
Under Alternative Exchange Rate Systems," International Monetary Fund, Stall 
Papers, vol.  19 (November 1972), pp. 503-32; and William H. Branson, Financial 
Capital  Flows in the U.S. Balance of Payments (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1968). process.  Assume for some reason-other  than current  changes  in mon- 
etary  or fiscal  policy-that  the expectation  of a domestic  depreciation  de- 
velops. At unchanged  interest  rates a capital  loss on domestic  assets  will 
be expected  and, accordingly,  at each level of foreign  interest  rates, do- 
mestic  interest  rates  will  have  to be correspondingly  higher.  In the diagram 
above  this  is shown  by an  upward  shift  of the  AA schedule. 
A short-run  equilibrium  is point B, where  the expectation  of a depre- 
ciation  has caused  the currency  actually  to depreciate.  In response,  world 
demand shifts toward  the depreciating  country's  goods and thus raises 
output  there while lowering  it abroad.  A speculative  disturbance,  there- 
fore, exerts a direct  impact  on equilibrium  levels of income. The causa- 
tion runs from exchange-rate  expectations  to incipient  capital flows to 
actual exchange-rate  movements  which affect the composition  of world 
spending  and therefore  equilibrium  output levels. For the depreciating 
country,  where  interest  rates  have risen,  the higher  level of output  is sus- 
tained by a trade surplus.  Abroad, where interest  rates have declined, 
output  is lower as are net sales to other  countries.  There  is a net outflow 
of capital  from the country  expected  to depreciate  and that finances  the 
trade  surplus. 
What happens  when the speculative  disturbance  subsides?  The distri- 
bution  of output  over time will return  precisely  to the initial  equilibrium 
at point  A. A disturbance,  therefore,  introduces  unnecessary  variability  in 
the composition  of world output  and in relative  prices. 
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And how can macroeconomic  policies  be used to offset  the speculative 
disturbance?  A policy that stabilizes  incomes  at point A requires  a mon- 
etary  contraction  in the country  expected  to depreciate  or a monetary  and 
fiscal expansion  abroad.  Simply  pegging  the exchange  rate in the face of 
an incipient  capital outflow amounts  to the correct  monetary  policy. It 
implies  a decline  in the domestic  quantity  of money  and  thus  brings  about 
the requisite  increase  in interest  rates.  With  higher  interest  rates,  however, 
aggregate  demand  is insufficient  to support  output and thus a fiscal ex- 
pansion (or some depreciation)  is required.  The important  point is that 
pegging  exchange  rates in the face of reversible  speculative  movements 
is an efficient  way  to stabilize  income. 
The assumed  adaptive  character  of expectations  influences  the results. 
Because  adaptive  expectations  are  sticky,  they could  transmit  purely  mon- 
etary  disturbances.  Assume an increase  in foreign  wages,  prices,  and the 
quantity  of money. If the home country's  currency  appreciated  to offset 
exactly  the higher  foreign  nominal  magnitudes,  all real  variables-in par- 
ticular,  the terms  of trade-would remain  unchanged  and  the home  coun- 
try would feel no impact.  But with adaptive  expectations  this full offset 
does not occur.  Future  rates  will move only slowly  and,  as a consequence, 
purely  nominal  disturbances  will be transmitted  internationally. 
In the short run, the depreciation  of the currency  that arises  from an 
increase  in money and prices abroad  induces  the expectation  of a future 
appreciation  because  expectations  are formed  adaptively.  Therefore,  the 
depreciation  falls short  of the full price  increase  and  nominal  interest  rates 
decline in the country  where  money and prices  have risen. With foreign 
price  increases  less than offset  by the depreciation,  demand  shifts  toward 
the home  country's  goods,  thus  raising  domestic  income  and  interest  rates. 
The short-run  equilibrium  is therefore  the same as in the last diagram. 
Domestic interest  rates and income have risen, foreign  real income has 
fallen, and so have foreign  interest  rates.  The foreign  currency  is expected 
to appreciate.  Only  over  time, as expectations  adjust,  is the price  increase 
translated  into an equal depreciation  and neutrality  restored  at point A. 
Clearly,  one way a country  can intervene  to prevent  the transmission 
of foreign  disturbances  is to peg the exchange  rate  and  share  in the foreign 
nominal expansion  by expanding  the domestic  money supply. Alterna- 
tively, once again a tightening  of monetary  policy together  with a fiscal 
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EXCHANGE-RATE  EXPECTATIONS,  THE  TERMS  OF  TRADE, 
AND  AGGREGATE  DEMAND 
The Keynesian  model, as reviewed  in the preceding  sections, stresses 
the identification  of the terms  of trade  with the exchange  rate.  By raising 
import  prices  relative  to export  and domestic  prices,  a currency  deprecia- 
tion worsens  the terms  of trade  and in turn shifts  demand  from the rest 
of the world  toward  the depreciating  country.  A depreciation  raises  world 
demand  for domestic  output  and  improves  the balance  of trade. 
It has become an accepted  fact, however,  that in many cases the trade 
balance worsens  over the short term in response  to a depreciation,  re- 
sponding  favorably  only over time. This reversal  of direction  of the trade 
effect-which is known  as the J-curve  and  is exemplified  by the aftermath 
of the 1967 U.K. devaluation-is ascribed  to a slow adjustment  of export 
prices and physical trade flows in contrast  with the rapid increase in 
mport  prices. 
To understand  the operation  of the J-curve  from  a macroeconomic  per- 
spective,  one must analyze  its macroeconomic  counterpart.  According  to 
the  national  income  identity, 
(4)  Y-C  + I +  G +  T, 
where  C is consumption,  I is investment,  G is government  spending,  and 
T denotes  net exports;  or, rewriting  the identity, 
(4')  T  a(S  -I  ) +  B, 
where  S is saving  and  B denotes  the budget  surplus,  all measured  in terms 
of domestic  output. 
The equations  point out that a worsening  of the trade  balance  must  be 
reflected  in a change  in the saving-investment  balance  or in the budget. 
The extent to which a worsening  of the trade  balance, such as arises  in 
the short  run from a depreciation,  is reflected  in the various  components 
depends  on (i)  the origin  of the depreciation,  (ii) whether  the deteriora- 
tion of the terms  of trade  is considered  temporary  or permanent,  and (iii) 
the speed of adjustment  in the substitution  of domestic  goods for imports 
and  the  flexibility  in intertemporal  substitution. 
When  substitution  possibilities  are high even in the short  run, a transi- 
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balance.  It gives rise to both intertemporal  and intercommodity  substitu- 
tion and thus  would clearly  improve  the trade  balance.  Saving  would  rise 
and investment  would decline as a reflection  of the intertemporal  substi- 
tution.  Such  a high  degree  of substitutability  is, however,  not characteristic 
of the average  commodity  since otherwise  patterns  such as the J-curve 
would not occur. Therefore,  in what follows, we assume  little scope for 
intertemporal  substitution  and a slow  rate  of intercommodity  substitution, 
even  for  permanent  changes  in exchange  rates. 
Consider  first  the case of a transitory  exchange-rate  movement  and as- 
sume, in the extreme,  no substitution.  As a consequence,  physical  trade 
flows and demand  for domestic  output  will be unaffected.  The worsening 
of the trade  balance  is "financed"  by a reduction  in saving.'0  Therefore, 
unanticipated,  transitory  changes  in the exchange  rate should  have quite 
similar  effects on the saving  rate and the trade balance: a depreciation 
should  reduce  both, while an appreciation  should  increase  both. The im- 
pact on inventory  investment  also tends  to reflect  the worsened  trade  bal- 
ance. An unanticipated  increase  in import  prices will raise the value of 
inventory accumulation,  thus constituting  part of the macroeconomic 
counterpart  of the trade  deficit. 
In contrast,  for a permanent deterioration  of the terms of trade the 
response  should certainly  be an adjustment  in the composition  and level 
of spending.  As the purchasing  power  of income,  and,  therefore,  real con- 
sumption  spending,  declines, that reduction  will fall on both domestic 
goods and imports.  Furthermore,  the substitution  effect  of a relative-price 
change  will (over time) shift demand  away from imports.  The demand 
for domestic  goods will rise or fall, and import  spending  will fall or rise, 
depending  on the elasticity  of demand  for imports.  With the saving  rate 
unchanged,  depreciation  clearly can exert a deflationary  impact unless 
it is offset by export or investment  responses,  or by an explicit macro- 
economic  policy. The impact  of the depreciation  on investment  spending 
is not predictable.  It will depend  largely  on the behavior  of interest  rates, 
aggregate  demand,  and the relative  price  of investment  goods in terms  of 
output  prices  and  wages.  Finally,  for exports  a quantity  adjustment  would 
be expected. A permanent  movement  in the terms of trade therefore 
10. Given unchanged spending on domestic goods and unchanged physical im- 
ports at higher prices, total spending must rise, as measured in units of domestic 
goods or in nominal magnitudes. Measured similarly, saving and the saving rate 
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leaves  the ambiguity  that inelastic  import  demand  may imply a reduction 
in spending  on domestic  goods. 
To consider  the implications  of this analysis  for short-run  macroeco- 
nomic  policy, assume  that in an attempt  to expand  aggregate  demand  the 
domestic  quantity  of money is increased.  At first  that policy reduces  do- 
mestic  interest  rates  and  tends  to induce  a capital  outflow  and therefore  a 
depreciation.  If expectations  about  the long-run  exchange  rate  are  formed 
adaptively,  the fall of the spot  rate  is viewed  as partially  temporary;  it thus 
creates  expectations  of an appreciation  and, therefore,  allows a decline 
in domestic  interest  rates. Nonetheless,  the expected  long-run  exchange 
rate will fall somewhat,  reducing  import demand and raising exports. 
Assuming  sufficient  elasticity,  import  spending  will decline  and  net aggre- 
gate  demand  will  rise  because  of the decline  in interest  rates.  Both sources, 
therefore,  contribute  to an expansion  in demand  for domestic  output.  But 
with  insufficient  elasticity,  import  spending  will rise and  the trade  balance 
will fall. Additional  effects  stem  from  the excess of the spot-rate  fall over 
the expected  long-run  fall. Here it is appropriate  to assume  that the re- 
sulting  increase  in import  prices is not offset by reduced  imports  or in- 
creased  exports  but rather  is financed  by a reduction  in saving. 
Presumably,  therefore,  an expansionary  monetary  policy will worsen 
the trade  balance  by inducing  a fall in the spot  rate.  Demand  for domestic 
output  will rise in response  to reduced  interest  rates and may rise or fall 
in response  to the permanent  component  of the exchange-rate  movement. 
If the adjustment  of trade  flows and domestic  demand  to movements  in 
the permanent  rate takes time, a reduction  in interest  rates may actually 
reduce  demand  for domestic  output  in the short  run.'1 
The ambiguity  that surrounds  the short-run  impact of exchange-rate 
movements  on demand  for domestic  output  suggests  that  when an expan- 
sion in aggregate  demand  is desired,  a combination  of monetary  and  fiscal 
policy tools should be applied.  Such a policy implies  that the exchange 
rate can remain  constant.  It avoids  the uncertainty  (arising  from the J- 
curve) associated  with an attempt  to expand  domestic  output  through  a 
net increase  in exports. 
A further  advantage  of the policy mix is that it avoids  the deterioration 
in the terms  of trade  associated  with a depreciation,  which  would  depress 
11. This possibility has been suggested by JUrg  Niehans, "Some Doubts About 
the Efficacy of Monetary Policy Under Flexible Exchange Rates," Journal of Inter- 
national  Economics, vol. 5 (August 1975), pp. 275-81. 554  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
the real income  of those already  employed.  The tradeoff  between  raising 
employment  and  maintaining  the real  income  of those  already  employed  is 
avoided  by a policy that  pegs exchange  rates  in the face of a fiscal  expan- 
sion. 
THE  ASSET-MARKET  APPROACH  TO  EXCHANGE-RATE 
DETERMINATION 
Recent  discussions  of the theory  of flexible  exchange  rates  have  empha- 
sized the role of asset markets,  as opposed to the trade balance or the 
balance  of payments,  in determining  exchange  rates  in the short  run.'2  But 
is there,  in fact, a significant  difference  between  the stock and  flow  views? 
To start out, the asset-market  view relies critically  on the assumption 
of perfect  mobility  and continuous,  instantaneous  equilibrium  in capital 
markets.  The economy  is always  in portfolio  equilibrium.  If domestic  and 
foreign  assets  are  perfect  substitutes,  the net yields  are always  and instan- 
taneously  equalized.  If the assets are imperfect  substitutes,  a convenient 
assumption  for some  purposes,  there  is nevertheless  portfolio  equilibrium 
with respect  to the composition  of assets at each point in time.'3  The in- 
stantaneous  achievement  of portfolio balance is understood  as perfect 
capital  mobility. 
Given this definition  of perfect  capital  mobility,  imperfect  capital  mo- 
bility  is the case  in which  portfolio  substitution  in response  to international 
yield differentials  occurs only over time. Such a view gives rise to a 
"capital-flow  function." 
Either  perfect  capital  mobility  with  imperfect  substitutability  or imper- 
fect mobility  allows  international  interest  differentials.  In both cases,  even 
a small country  can affect  the interest  rate by changing  the relative  sup- 
plies of assets. In sharp contrast,  under the benchmark  case of perfect 
capital  mobility  and perfect  substitutability,  nominal  interest-rate  differ- 
12. See, for example, the papers in the Scandinavian  Journal of Economics, vol. 
78, no. 2 (1976),  as well as the comments by William Branson and the general dis- 
cussion on Marina  v. N. Whitman,  "Global  Monetarism  and the Monetary  Approach 
to the Balance of Payments,"  BPEA, 3:1975, pp. 537-42,  551-55. 
13. On this point, see Lance Girton and Dale W. Henderson, "Financial Capital 
Movements and Central Bank Behavior in  a  Two-Country, Short-run Portfolio 
Balance Model,"  Journal of Monetary  Economics, vol. 2 (January 1976), pp. 33-61, 
and Rudiger Dornbusch, "Capital Mobility and Portfolio Balance," in Robert Z. 
Aliber, ed.,  The Political Economy of  Monetary Reform  (London: Macmillan), 
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entials  are possible only because  of expectational  errors,  or, in the long 
run, because of perfectly  anticipated  differences  in inflation  rates con- 
sistent  with  equality  of real  rates. 
In its sharpest  formulation,  the asset-market  view  focuses  on the bench- 
mark  case and  moreover  assumes  that  income  and  nominal  asset  supplies 
are predetermined  at any point in time. With such a set of assumptions, 
exchange-rate  determination  comes down to an equation  such as 2, in 
which the equilibrium  level of the current  exchange  rate is determined 
by nominal asset supplies,  and the given level of real income and per- 
haps nonmonetary  assets, and is independent  of the current  account.  By 
assumption,  any current-account  imbalance  can be financed  in the world 
market  at prevailing  interest  rates.  To summarize,  in the short  run, given 
wealth and asset supplies,  the exchange  rate is determined  in asset mar- 
kets, and determines  the current  account;  the current  account,  through 
its effects  on income,  prices,  and wealth,  affects  the rate  of change  of the 
exchange  rate.'4 
Two extensions  of the basic conceptual  framework  significantly  modify 
its force. With the first, which incorporates  rational expectations,  the 
current  equilibrium  level of exchange  rates  is a function  of the entire  sub- 
sequent  path of the economy,  including  developments  in income,  prices, 
and wealth.  Although  these  variables  may be predetermined  at a point  in 
time, their subsequent  evolution affects  the current  equilibrium  level of 
the exchange  rate  and  thus  restores  the general-equilibrium  determination 
of exchange  rates  that was put in question  by some variants  of the asset- 
market  view.'5 
14. See Pentti J. K. Kouri, "The Exchange Rate and the Balance of Payments 
in the Short Run and in  the Long Run: A  Monetary Approach," Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics, vol. 78, no. 2 (1976),  pp. 280-304; Stanley W. Black, Inter- 
national Money Markets and Flexible Exchange Rates, Studies in  International 
Finance 32  (Princeton University, International Finance Section, 1973);  Rudiger 
Dornbusch, "A Portfolio Balance Model of the Open Economy," Journal of Mon- 
etary Economics, vol. 1 (January 1975), pp. 1-20; and Rudiger  Dornbusch, "Capital 
Mobility, Flexible Exchange Rates and Macroeconomic  Equilibrium,"  in E. Claassen 
and P. Salin, eds., Recent Issues in Internationial  Monetary  Economics (Amsterdam: 
North-Holland, 1976; U.S. distributor,  American Elsevier). 
15. Rudiger Dornbusch, "Expectations  and Exchange Rate Dynamics," Journal 
of Political Economy, vol.  84  (December 1976),  pp. 1161-76,  and Pentti Kouri, 
"Foreign Exchange Market Speculation and Stabilization Policy  Under Flexible 
Exchange Rates" (paper presented at the Conference on the Political Economy of 
Inflation  and Unemployment in Open Economics, Athens, Greece, 1976; processed). 556  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
The second extension, imperfect substitutability  of  assets, provides 
scope for an independent  domestic  interest  rate on the basis of relative 
asset supplies  rather  than exchange-rate  expectations.  It does not, how- 
ever, alter the view that exchange-rate  determination  is independent  of 
the current  account.  Perhaps  the most important  corollary  of imperfect 
substitutability  is the ability  to conduct exchange-rate  and interest-rate 
policies  that are  independent  of one another.  With  perfect  substitutability 
there  is a one-to-one  correspondence  among  interest  rates,  foreign  rates, 
and the expected  premium  on foreign  exchange.  With imperfect  substi- 
tutability,  given the mechanism  of, say, adaptive  expectations,  a central 
bank  can set both an exchange  rate and an interest  rate.'6 
Models of imperfect  substitution  remind  us that not all exchange-rate 
movements  need be related to monetary  disturbances.  It is possible to 
separate  an asset-market  view from  a narrow  monetary  view of exchange- 
rate determination.  For example, if money demand is independent  of 
wealth and expected  yields on foreign assets, shifts in asset preferences 
between  domestic  and foreign  securities  will alter  exchange  rates  with no 
effect  whatsoever  on the monetary  sector. 
An alternative  to imperfect  substitutability  is slow adjustment  in port- 
folio composition.  In such a view, monetary  conditions,  along with pre- 
determined  income, determine  interest  rates while the balance of pay- 
ments determines  the exchange  rate. This view yields, in the short  run, 
the same  predictions  as a model  of imperfect  substitution,  and  shares  with 
the asset-market  approach  the emphasis  on the relation  between  interest 
rates and exchange  rates. To appreciate  this point consider  the balance- 
of-payments  equation 
(5)  BOP  =  T(e,y,...)  +  K(r,r* +  X); X =  X(e,e-1... 
where K is the net rate of capital inflow. With income predetermined, 
monetary  conditions determine  the interest rate. Balance-of-payments 
16. On this argument,  see Henry C. Wallich, "Statement,"  in International  Mon- 
etary Reform and Exchange Rate Management, Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on International Trade, Investment and Monetary Policy of the House Committee 
on  Banking, Currency and Housing, and the Subcommittee on International Eco- 
nomics of the Joint Economic Committee, 94:1 (Government  Printing  Office, 1975), 
pp. 209-30;  and Lance Girton and Dale W. Henderson, "The Effects of  Central 
Bank Intervention in Domestic and Foreign Assets Under Fixed and Flexible Ex- 
change Rates," in D. Logue and others, eds., The Eflects of Exchange Rate Adjust- 
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adjustment  is brought  about by the interaction  of actual and expected 
exchange  rates.  Expected  exchange  rates serve  the important  purpose  of 
inducing  speculative  capital  flows. 
A decline of domestic  interest  rates, as would result  from a monetary 
expansion,  tends to induce a capital  outflow  and a balance-of-payments 
deficit. The resulting  fall of the spot exchange  rate will proceed until 
capital  outflows  just match the trade surplus.  The most interesting  case 
is one in which  the trade  balance  responds  to the exchange  rate  either  not 
at all or perversely.  Here the interaction  between actual and expected 
exchange  rates stands  out most sharply.  With  the trade  balance  given or 
deteriorating  in response  to the depreciation,  the capital  account  will have 
to improve  if balance-of-payments  equilibrium  is to be restored.  The spot 
rate will have to fall enough to invite a speculative  capital inflow even 
though  domestic  interest  rates have declined.  That is achieved  by a de- 
preciation  of the currency  (on the spot rate) sufficiently  large  to arouse 
the expectation  of an appreciation  equal to or larger  than the interest 
differential.  The large  drop  in the spot  rate  must  therefore  lead to a specu- 
lative  capital  inflow  that  covers  the depreciation-induced  trade  deficit. 
Such an interpretation  seems to accord  with the relevant  facts about 
exchange  rates and interest  rates and, for practical  purposes,  cannot  be 
distinguished  from  the asset-market  view. Indeed,  its focus on speculative 
capital  flows as the chief link between  exchange  rates and interest  rates 
precisely  duplicates  that of the asset  view.17  The main  issue in an appro- 
priate  interpretation  of the flow view is realistically  defining  the impor- 
tance  of the capital  account  and  deemphasizing  adjustments  in the current 
account  as part of the short-run  accommodating  movement. 
Both views of exchange-rate  determination  suggest  why rates  fluctuate 
a good deal in the short run. These fluctuations  simply  reflect  those in 
short-term  interest  rates. A rise in domestic  interest  rates because of a 
17. The flow of capital mobility is emphasized by Peter B. Kenen, "Flexible Ex- 
change Rates and National  Autonomy," Revista Internazionale di  Scienze Eco- 
nomiche e Commerciale [Milan: Bocconi University], vol. 23 (February 1976), pp. 
105-27; Polly Allen and Peter B. Kenen, "Portfolio  Adjustment  in Open Economies: 
A Comparison  of Alternative Specifications,"  Weltwirtschaftliches  Archiv, vol. 112, 
no. 1 (1976),  pp. 33-72; Niehans, "Some Doubts"; and John Williamson, "Another 
Case of Profitable, Destabilising Speculation,"  Journal of International  Economics, 
vol. 3 (February 1973), pp. 77-83, and John Williamson, "Exchange-Rate  Flexibility 
and Reserve Use," Scandinavian  Journal of Economics, vol. 78, no. 2  (1976),  pp. 
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monetary  contraction  or an increase  in money demand  will produce  an 
interest  differential  that could generate  a capital  flow. The appreciation 
of the currency  will continue  until  it is sufficient  to cause  the anticipation 
of depreciation  at a rate corresponding  to the interest  differential.  The 
required  exchange-rate  movement  will be larger  the higher  the elasticity 
of exchange-rate  expectations  and the higher  the substitutability  between 
domestic  and foreign  assets. Overshooting  of exchange  rates thus simply 
reflects  the requirement  that expected  asset  yields  be kept  in line. 
This view is perfectly  compatible  with a current  account  that is un- 
responsive  or even responds perversely  in the short run. Indeed, the 
exchange-rate  movement  will have to be larger the less (or the more 
perversely)  the current-account  balance  reacts  to the exchange  rate.  The 
argument  that the current  account  cannot  be a determinant  of exchange 
rates  because  it moves  little  relative  to them  misses  the  point  that  exchange 
rates  move so much  because  the current  account  moves so little. 
Exchange  Rates,  Prices,  and Competitiveness 
The preceding  review  of theory  has developed  the Keynesian  model as 
a framework  for analyzing  short-run  exchange-rate  questions.  The pur- 
pose of this section is to round out and support  that analysis  by some 
empirical  evidence  on two key issues. First, we explore  whether,  in fact, 
exchange-rate  movements  significantly  affect  a country's  competitive  posi- 
tion. The Keynesian  model  identifies  the terms  of trade  with  the exchange 
rate;  it essentially  assumes  that  prices  and costs are  fixed  in terms  of sup- 
plier currency  and that  therefore  a change  in exchange  rates  raises  import 
prices  relative  to export  prices.  We examine  this first  question  from two 
perspectives.  How do exchange-rate  movements  affect  a country's  export 
prices compared  with those of its competitors?  To what extent do com- 
petitors'  prices, in turn, feed back onto a country's  export  pricing?  We 
conclude  that exchange  rates  have an important,  persistent  effect  on rela- 
tive prices or competitiveness.  At the same time, for most countries  we 
study,  competitors'  prices  exert  some impact  on export  prices. 
The second  key issue  is the extent  to which  trade  flows  adjust  to changes 
in competitiveness.  Here we find  that competitiveness  significantly  affects 
trade  flows,  but  with a considerable  lag. This evidence,  therefore,  supports 
the  idea  of a J-curve. Rudiger  Dornbusch  and Paul Krugman  559 
EXCHANGE  RATES  AND  RELATIVE  PRICES 
Kravis and Lipsey and, more recently, Isard have forcefully made the 
point that exchange  rates affect  relative  prices.'8  Their  work shows that 
exchange-rate  movements  have significant,  persistent  effects on relative 
prices  even at a quite  disaggregated  level, and  suggests  that  the law of one 
price  may  not hold  in the short  run. 
Clearly,  these results, although  confirming  the Keynesian  model, are 
inconsistent  with well-entrenched  theoretical  reasoning.  A reconciliation 
might be found in differences  between commodity  groups. Departures 
from  the law of one price are plausible  for customer  goods;  they are less 
likely for auction goods.'9  Customer  goods are traded in monopolistic 
competition  and their pricing  is based on standard  cost. Exchange-rate 
movements  will not affect  costs  significantly  in the short  run  and  therefore 
will leave supply prices unchanged  in terms of the supplier's  currency. 
In this way an exchange-rate  change  will alter the relative  price of any 
two competing  customer  goods. 
Auction goods, by contrast,  are traded  in organized  international  mar- 
kets  through  a market-clearing  pricing  process.  Here  exchange-rate  move- 
ments  should  affect  supply  prices  but not realized  relative  prices.  Between 
auction  goods and  customer  goods  lies a gray  area  in which  there  is at least 
some transitory  scope for exchange-rate  effects  on relative  prices. 
These analytical  considerations  suggest  the desirability  of a test for a 
distinction  between  customer  and auction  goods in the relative-price  re- 
sponse  to exchange-rate  movements.  But such  a test  is difficult.  At a some- 
what  aggregative  level, indexes  for auction  goods-say,  crude  materials- 
are very sensitive  to differences  in composition  across  countries  and are 
dominated  by the real disturbances  that affect  these Drices.  Thus  we con- 
18. Irving B. Kravis and Robert E. Lipsey, "Export  Prices and the Transmission 
of  Inflation" (University of  Pennsylvania, 1976; processed); Kravis and Lipsey, 
Price Competitiveness  in World Trade (Columbia University Press for the National 
Bureau of Economic Research, 1971); and Peter Isard, "How Far Can We Push the 
'Law of One Price'?"  International  Finance Discussion Papers 84 (Federal Reserve 
System, 1976; processed). 
19. See Arthur M. Okun, "Inflation: Its Mechanics and Welfare Costs," BPEA, 
2:1975, pp. 351-90; William D. Nordhaus, "Inflation  Theory and Policy," American 
Economic Review, vol. 66 (May 1976), pp. 59-64;  Robert J. Gordon, "Alternative 
Responses of Policy to External Supply Shocks,"  BPEA, 1:1975, pp. 183-204; and 
Paul Krugman, "Macroeconomics in an Economy With Both Fixed and Flexible 
Prices" (Massachusetts  Institute of Technology, April 1976; processed). 560  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1976 
centrate  in the next sections  on the impact  of exchange  rates  on the rela- 
tive  price  of manufactured  goods. 
EXCHANGE  RATES  AND  COMPETITIVENESS 
We now consider the effect of exchange-rate  movement  on relative 
prices in a broader  time perspective.  Figure 1 shows the effective ex- 
change-rate  index and a relative-price  index for several countries,  both 
with a base 1970 =  1.00. The effective  exchange  rate  is formed  by using 
bilateral  export weights  for a group  of eleven industrialized  countries.20 
The relative-price  index  measures  a country's  unit export-value  index  for 
manufactured  goods relative  to that of its competitors,  measured  in the 
same currency  and using  bilateral  export  weights.  Thus an increase  in the 
relative-price  index implies  that a country's  export  prices  have risen  rela- 
tive to those of its competitors  and  that, accordingly,  its competitive  posi- 
tion has deteriorated. 
The indexes  of U.S. effective  exchange  rates  and  relative  prices  depicted 
in figure  1 show a continuing,  though  modest,  appreciation  of the dollar 
from 1961 until 1971, accompanied  by a progressive  loss of competitive- 
ness. Through  the sixties, the U.S. relative-price  position worsened  by 
about 8 percent,  corresponding  to the "overvaluation"  of the dollar  that 
was widely  discussed.2'  Next, through  1973, the successive  depreciations 
of the dollar brought  about a dramatic  reversal  that by 1974 left the 
United States  in a competitive  position  better  than  that at any time in the 
sixties. In the 1971-73 period  the gain in competitiveness  was achieved, 
one for one, by the depreciation  of the dollar.  After 1973 some erosion 
of the competitive  position arose from an effective  appreciation  of the 
20.  The group includes the United States, Canada, Japan, Germany, the Nether- 
lands, Belgium, France, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland,  and the United Kingdom. 
21.  See, for example, Bela Balassa, "Recent  Developments in the Competitiveness 
of American Industry  and Prospects  for the Future,"  in Factors Affecting the United 
States Balance of Payments, Compilation of Studies Prepared  for the Subcommittee 
on International Exchange and Payments of the Joint Economic Committee, 87:2 
(GPO,  1962),  pp. 27-54;  Richard N.  Cooper, "Dollar Deficits and Postwar Eco- 
nomic Growth,"  Review of Economics and Statistics,  vol. 46 (May 1964), pp. 155- 
59; Richard  N. Cooper, "The Competitive  Position of the United States,"  in Seymour 
E. Harris, ed., The Dollar in Crisis (Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), pp. 137-64; 
H.  S. Houthakker, "Exchange Rate Adjustment,"  in Factors Affecting the United 
States Balance of Payments, compilation cited above, pp. 287-304; and Samuelson, 
"Theoretical  Notes on Trade Problems." 0  0 
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dollar but the effects of that move were dampened  by a superior  U.S. 
price performance.  The basic conclusion  is that for the United States  the 
depreciation,  far from matching  current  differentials  in inflation,  has, in 
fact, brought  about a significant  improvement  in competitive  position. 
Moreover,  given the low and stable  rate of inflation  in the United States, 
that competitive  advantage  is unlikely to be lost in the next few years 
unless  there  is a major  appreciation  of the dollar. 
The case of Japan  is precisely  the opposite  of that of the United  States. 
A strong  price performance  in the sixties produced  a significant  gain in 
competitive  position  that altogether  eroded  under  the impact  of the 1971- 
73 adjustment  in exchange  rates.  Again the movement  in exchange  rates 
is very closely matched  by the change  in competitive  position. 
In Germany  and the United Kingdom  exchange-rate  movements  had 
relatively  little impact  on the competitive  position.  These countries  were 
at opposite  ends of the domestic-inflation  spectrum;  their exchange-rate 
movements  largely  reflected  this difference  and had only limited effects 
on their  respective  relative-price  positions. 
COMPETITIVENESS  AND  TRADE  FLOWS 
The next step in providing  evidence  relevant  to the Keynesian  model 
is to determine  whether  an improvement  in a country's  competitive  posi- 
tion raises its exports and lowers its imports of manufactured  goods. 
Figure 2, which depicts a country's  share in industrial  countries'  real 
manufacturing  exports and the relative-price  index, is suggestive  in this 
context. The figure confirms  the progressive  deterioration  in the U.S. 
competitive  position in the sixties and the corresponding  decline in the 
U.S. share  in manufacturing  exports.  Evident  from  the figure  is the lagged 
character  of the adjustment  to relative  prices,  which is the basis for the 
J-curve.  Following  the 1971 devaluation,  the export  share  first  improved 
in 1973; by 1975, the cumulative  improvement  in response  to the altered 
competitive  position  was significant. 
For the United Kingdom  the figure  shows the recurrent  pattern  of de- 
preciations  that  improve  competitiveness  until  that  gain  is rapidly  inflated 
away,  thus  bringing  on a renewed  overvaluation. 
To establish  evidence  for an effective  adjustment  mechanism,  we tested 
formally  whether  the relation  between  the export  prices  of a country  and 
its competitors  is a determinant  of its share  in world exports  of manu- 0  C>~~~~~~~~~~ 
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factured  goods. For each of the eleven countries-the nine reported  in 
table 1 and Canada  and Sweden-we  tested an equation  with the share 
as the dependent  variable  and a time trend and a distributed  lag on the 
relative  price as explanatory  variables.  For seven of the countries,  we 
found a clearly  significant  price effect.  The elasticities  of the real export 
share  with respect  to the relative  price  range  between  one and three. 
While the relative price clearly has an important  effect, it operates 
with a considerable  lag. With  the estimates  allowing  for lags up to twelve 
quarters,  the mean lag is around  four to six quarters  for most countries. 
By comparison,  Junz and Rhomberg  found much longer lags and an 
elasticity  of 3.88, which exceeds  every  one of our estimates.22 
The estimates  for Canada  and Sweden show perverse  elasticities  and 
are  not reported.  For Canada  the obvious  reason  is the automotive  agree- 
ment with the United States  that allowed  Canadian  exports  of transport 
equipment  to rise between  1964 and 1969 from 11.4 percent  to 39.0 per- 
cent of all Canadian  manufactured  exports.23  In the case of Sweden,  the 
explanation  is less obvious, although  it may be related  to the operation 
of the European  Free  Trade  Association. 
Combined with the information  about exchange rates and relative 
prices,  the evidence  of table 1 makes  clear that a sustained  depreciation 
will improve  a country's  competitive  position and that such an improve- 
ment  will raise  exports  over time.  In the short  run,  though,  elasticities  are 
small;  for example, the U.S. elasticity  for the first  four quarters  is only 
0.33, or less than 20 percent  of the full adjustment.  Such  small  short-run 
elasticities  can, therefore,  give rise to the J-curve. Supplementary  evi- 
dence on the role of relative  prices in determining  export performance 
22.  See  Helen  B.  Junz and Rudolf  R.  Rhomberg, "Price Competitiveness in 
Export Trade Among Industrial Countries,"  American Economic Review, vol. 63 
(May 1973), pp. 412-18. See, too, the estimates in H. S. Houthakker  and Stephen  P. 
Magee, "Income and Price Elasticities in World Trade,"  Review of Economics and 
Statistics, vol.  51  (May  1969),  pp.  111-25,  as well as the survey by Stephen P. 
Magee, "Prices,  Incomes, and Foreign Trade," in Peter B. Kenen, ed., International 
Trade and Finance: Frontiers for Research (Cambridge University Press, 1975). 
23.  Calculated from United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 
various issues. The automotive agreement applies to cars, trucks, and parts. This is 
essentially standard  international  trade classification  73, which we have taken as the 
basis for calculating the impact of  the automotive agreement. Using annual data 
for 1962-74  and excluding automotive products we find that the Canadian relative 
price exerts a significant  impact on the export share. The elasticity is 2 with a mean 
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is shown in equation  6, designed  to explain the level of U.S. manufac- 
turing  exports (X).  World  demand (A*)  and the relative  price of U.S. 
exports  (PUS) are significant  determinants.24 
(6)  In X  -  1.89  +  1.421nA*  -  2.35 In  Pus, 
(1.24)  (0.31)  (0.38) 
A2  =  0.97;  Durbin-Watson  =  2.35. 
where  the price variable  is again entered  as an unrestricted  third-degree 
polynomial  with a twelve-quarter  distributed  lag. (The numbers  in paren- 
theses are standard  errors.) The price variable  is highly significant  but 
again enters  with a significant  lag. The elasticity  within  four quarters  is 
only 0.2 and  the mean  lag is eight  quarters. 
In summary,  then,  there  is a significant  price  responsiveness,  but adjust- 
ment  lags  are  important  and  run  to years,  not quarters. 
EXPORT  PRICING 
Exchange-rate  movements  lead to changes  in the terms of trade that 
are of considerable  duration.  Import  prices  respond  rapidly  and substan- 
tially to exchange  rates;  but export  prices are relatively  sticky,  behaving 
as if based primarily  on domestic  labor cost rather  than on competitors' 
prices. 
We investigated  the relative  roles of labor  costs and  competitors'  prices 
in export  pricing.  The results  in table 2 use annual  data for unit export 
values for manufactured  goods, a variable  reflecting  standard  unit labor 
costs, and competitors'  prices.  Although  they  are  not striking  and  must  be 
considered  preliminary,  they do give an idea of the process  at work.  Thus 
for U.S. manufactured  goods labor  cost apparently  is the determinant  of 
export prices; competitors'  prices are unimportant.25  By contrast, in 
24.  In equation 6, U.S.  manufacturing exports are a quarterly quantity index 
seasonally adjusted using a geometric moving average. The world-demand  variable 
is an index of industrial  production of U.S. trading partners  with weights given by 
their share in U.S. exports in  1970. The export data come from United Nations, 
Monthly Bulletin of  Statistics, various issues. Industrial production indexes come 
from International  Monetary  Fund, International  Financial Statistics,  various issues. 
The equation was estimated for the period 1964:1 to 1975:2. 
25.  The same result is noted by Peter B. Clark, "The Effects of Recent Exchange 
Rate Changes on the U.S. Trade Balance," in Peter B. Clark and others, eds., The 
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Canada,  competitors'  prices-and  this  means  to a large  extent  U.S. prices 
-have  a significant  effect, reflected  in an elasticity  of 0.64 for export 
prices with respect to competitors'  prices. In the United Kingdom  and 
France,  similarly,  competitors'  prices  have a significant  impact  on export 
unit  values. 
These results explain how exchange-rate  movements  affect  the short- 
run  terms  of trade.  They support  the view that  export  prices  remain  sensi- 
tive to domestic costs and therefore  do not simply match competitors' 
prices. At the same time the results  for all countries  except the United 
States point to a considerable  responsiveness  of export prices to com- 
petitors'  prices, contrary  to the assumption  of constant  export  prices in 
the Keynesian  model. 
Exchange  Rates and the Domestic  Inflationary  Process 
Appraisals  of flexible  rates have noted that exchange-rate  movements 
have, on average,  tended  to offset  divergent  movements  in national  price 
levels. Countries  with high inflation,  including  Italy and  the United  King- 
dom, have experienced  depreciations  while those  with low inflation  rates, 
such as Germany  and Switzerland,  have experienced  large appreciations. 
In this context, Emminger  notes that "the transition  to floating  in the 
spring  of 1973 marks  exactly the point in time when the anti-inflation 
policy in Germany  began to bite and when the German  rate of price in- 
crease  broke away  from  the general  international  inflation  convoy."26  An 
analysis  of empirical  evidence  on movements  in exchange  rates  and  prices 
leads Kemp to conclude  that "when  the exchange  rates  had the greatest 
amount  of freedom  to respond  to changes  in fundamental  factors, their 
observed  movements  paralleled  relative  inflation  and money  growth  rates 
most closely. The results . . . thus lend support  to the hypothesis  that 
movements  in exchange  rates,  particularly  in the long run,  are  determined 
by relative  inflationary  pressures  and  relative  rates  of money  growth."27 
A concept in which exchange-rate  movements  offset divergent  price 
trends  implicitly  takes domestic  inflation  rates as the causal  force in the 
26.  Otmar Emminger, On  the  Way to  a  New  International Monetary Order 
(American Enterprise  Institute, 1976), p. 8. 
27.  Donald S. Kemp, "The U.S. Dollar in International Markets: Mid-1970 to 
Mid-1976," Federal Reserve Bank of  St. Louis, Review, vol.  58  (August 1976), 
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movement  of the exchange  rate;  and it ignores,  or at least deemphasizes, 
the causation  that runs from exchange  rates to domestic  inflation.  But 
this latter  causal  process  aggravates  the problems  of soft-money  countries 
and lightens  the burden  of hard-money  countries.  This "vicious  and vir- 
tuous  circle"  has been recognized  by the Organisation  for Economic  Co- 
operation  and  Development  and  the Bank  for International  Settlements.28 
In the short-run  perspective  appropriate  for macroeconomic  questions, 
exchange-rate  movements  can be viewed  as a source  of inflationary  pres- 
sure.  Depreciation,  particularly  in medium-sized  and small  countries,  has 
a strong, direct impact on inflation  of wholesale and consumer  prices. 
The main channels  are (a)  costs of imported  materials,  (b) wages, (c) 
import  prices  of finished  goods, (d)  aggregate  demand,  and (e)  a direct 
spillover  into  prices  of import-competing  goods. 
The most important  channel  may be the direct  effect  of material  costs 
on domestic  costs and prices.  By raising  the domestic-currency  prices  of 
imported  materials  a depreciation  will bring  about  higher  costs  which  will 
be passed  on directly  into higher  domestic  prices.  That  process  can oper- 
ate very fast and essentially  without  regard  to the unemployment  rate. 
Unlike wage pressure  that builds up as a consequence  of sustained  high 
demand,  material  prices  can rise simply  because  a decline  in interest  rates 
forces a depreciation  of the currency.  The point is particularly  important 
for the conduct of monetary  policy because it implies that a monetary 
expansion  translates  into inflation  much  faster  and  with  much  less impact 
on real demand  than  it would  in the absence  of depreciation. 
The inflationary  impact  of depreciation  on wages depends  largely  on 
the weight  of imports  in the cost of living.  In countries  that  depend  heavily 
on imported  food, such as Britain,  the effect  is important.29  Nevertheless, 
28.  See Bank for International  Settlements,  Forty-Sixth  Annual Report, 1st April 
1975-31st  March 1976,  pp.  30-32;  Paul Lewis, "The Weak Get  Weaker With 
Floating Rates," New  York Times  (October 10,  1976);  and David  King, "The 
Performance of Exchange Rates in the Recent Period of Floating: Exchange Rates 
and Relative Rates of Inflation" (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, May 1976; 
processed). 
29.  See Morris Goldstein, "The Effect of Exchange Rate Changes on Wages and 
Prices in the United Kingdom: An Empirical Study,"  International  Monetary Fund, 
Stafi Papers, vol.  21  (November  1974),  pp. 694-739;  George L. Perry, "Deter- 
minants of Wage Inflation around the World," BPEA, 2:1975, pp. 403-35; and the 
theoretical analysis in  Michael Bruno, "Wage and Price Dynamics in the  Open 
Economy" (Hebrew University, 1976; processed). The impact of  depreciation on 
inflation in  the United States has been studied by William Nordhaus and John 570  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
in the context  of short-run  movements  in exchange  rates,  it is perhaps  not 
very important  because  it is a time-consuming  process  for the impact  of 
exchange  rates on the cost of living  to be reflected  ultimately  in wages.80 
In a different  perspective,  the relation between exchange rates and 
wages is all-important.  Any expectation  that a current  depreciation  will 
be sustained  and raise  prices  will influence  current  wage settlements  and, 
therefore,  affect  inflation.  Clearly,  in this context  the U.K. wage stabiliza- 
tion program  in mid-1976  was critical  and  entirely  appropriate. 
Exchange  rates also affect the domestic  price level via aggregate  de- 
mand, as imports  give way to domestic  goods and exports  expand.  Since 
the real adjustment  to price  changes  is slow, and since  most of the impact 
on domestic  prices  will come  through  induced  changes  in employment  and 
wages,  this process  works  with considerable  lag; and in the short  run  the 
impact  may be much smaller  than that operating  through  material  prices 
and through  the direct  increase  in prices  of imported  finished  goods and 
food. 
Table  3 presents  reduced-form  equations  for the  impact  of import  prices 
on the inflation  process.  The table shows selected  equations  that explain 
inflation  in consumer  prices  in terms  of its own lagged  rate, activity  vari- 
ables, and inflation  in import  prices.3'  Clearly,  inflation  in import  prices 
contributes  much  to inflation  in consumer  prices.  The coefficients  for most 
countries  are both sizable and precisely  estimated.  In particular,  the co- 
efficient  of 0.14 for the United States exceeds the ratio of total imports 
to consumption,  which  is 0.12. Similarly,  for other  countries  except  Ger- 
many,  import  prices  have a strong  impact  on consumer  prices.32 
Shoven, "Inflation 1973:  The  Year of  Infamy," Challenge, vol.  17  (May-June 
1974),  pp.  14-22; and Richard Berner and others, "Intemational Sources of Do- 
mestic Inflation,"  paper 3, in Studies in Price Stability and Economic Growth, Pre- 
pared for the Joint Economic Committee, 94:1 (GPO, 1975). 
30. There is  some question whether the proper inflation variable in the wage 
equation is consumer price inflation or inflation of value-added prices. On the em- 
pirical evidence see Perry, "Determinants  of Wage Inflation around the World." 
31.  On the role of import prices in domestic inflation  see, too, Franco Modigliani 
and Lucas Papademos, "Targets  for Monetary Policy in the Coming Year," BPEA, 
1:1975, pp.  141-63;  and Sung Y.  Kwack, "Price Linkages in an Interdependent 
World Economy:  Price Responses to  Exchange Rate and Activity Changes," in 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Price Behavior, 1965-1974,  forthcoming. 
32. The extremely small coefficient for Germany is puzzling-the  more so be- 
cause the appreciation  of the mark is believed to have dampened inflationary  pres- 
sure in Germany. Part of  the explanation is likely to come from the automatic 
adjustment  of agricultural  prices in response to exchange-rate  movements. &Z  C1  90  0  t-  s 
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The link between exchange-rate  deterioration  and domestic  inflation 
takes on importance  in the context of our earlier  argument  that an ex- 
pansionary  monetary  policy  leads  to a fall in the exchange  rate.  The pres- 
ent line of argument  establishes  a direct,  short-run  link  between  monetary 
policy and inflation.  The conventional  case for stabilization  policy, in- 
cluding monetary  policy-that  it acts promptly  on quantities  and only 
slowly  on prices-is,  therefore,  lost. 
The argument  is illustrated  in the diagram  below. The schedule  PP 
is the conventional  flat short-run  Phillips curve that relates the rate of 
change of value-added  prices-say,  the GNP deflator-to  the level of 
unemployment.  The argument  for monetary  policy is that the Phillips 
curve is flat, that wage pressure  is slow to build up to an expansion  in 
aggregate  demand,  and  that, accordingly,  there  is an advantageous  trade- 
off between  inflation  and unemployment  in the short  run, from, say, AO 
to A'. But an attempt  to expand the economy  through  monetary  policy 
in this manner  will immediately  cause the exchange  rate to fall (or to 
M 
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fall faster), thus raising domestic  prices of imports  and hence causing 
consumer  and wholesale  prices to rise at a higher  rate. In terms  of the 
diagram,  the schedule  P"P" embodies  the inflation  arising  from  domestic 
wage pressure  and from the impact  of depreciation  on import  prices. It 
thus represents  inflation  of market  prices  rather  than  value-added  prices. 
In terms  of market  prices an attempt  to reduce unemployment  from u? 
to u' will raise  inflation  to a greater  extent,  as shown  by point  A". 
The short-run  Phillips curve in terms of market  prices is MM and is 
clearly much steeper than the conventional  Phillips curve, quite apart 
from expectational  adjustments.  If, in addition,  wage settlements  are sig- 
nificantly  affected  by exchange-rate  developments,  that steepening  effect 
is further  intensified.33 
Summary  and  Policy  Conclusions 
This paper has laid out a theory of the role of exchange  rates in a 
short-run  macroeconomic  context. There are five key building  blocks: 
(1)  a relationship  between  interest  rates and exchange  rates, including 
exchange-rate  expectations;  (2)  a relationship  between exchange  rates 
and relative  prices, such that in the short run a currency  depreciation 
(appreciation)  raises (lowers) the relative  price of imports;  (3)  a re- 
sponse of trade  flows to relative  prices,  but with a lag measured  in terms 
of years; (4)  a significant  impact of import  prices on consumer  prices, 
even  in the short  run,  which  implies  that a currency  depreciation  of, say, 5 
percent  would raise consumer  prices  by between  0.5 and 1 percent,  de- 
pending on the response  of import  prices to the exchange  rate; (5)  a 
response  of export prices to competitors'  prices, but one that is limited 
in the short  run  by the stickiness  in export  prices. 
The major  implication  of these relations  for short-run  macroeconomic 
policy  in an open economy  is that  the Phillips  curve  is much  steeper  when 
monetary  policy is used for expansion.  Indeed,  the central  message  of the 
empirical  results  is that  prices  will rise  promptly  in response  to a monetary 
expansion  but that the real effects may even be dampened  or perverse. 
The J-curve  in the short  run  implies  that a depreciation  induced  by mon- 
33.  Of course, the price adjustment  in response to a monetary increase is a once- 
and-for-all increase in the level of prices, not a sustained inflationary  process. It is 
nevertheless useful to cast the issue in terms of  Phillips curves because the price 
increase will appear in the measured inflation rate over any particular  time period 
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etary  expansion  may actually  lower  the real demand  for domestic  output. 
In these circumstances  monetary  expansion  may actually  lead to more 
inflation  and more  unemployment. 
A first  presumption  then is that countries  should  use a monetary-fiscal 
policy mix, applying  fiscal  expansion  to stimulate  aggregate  demand  and 
an accommodating  monetary  policy to maintain  the rate of interest  and 
therefore  exchange  rates.34 
A second implication  derives  from the significant  impact  of exchange 
rates on import  prices and of import  prices on domestic  prices. Given 
the influence  of exchange-rate  movements  on domestic  prices,  a country 
would want to intervene  to offset exogenous disturbances  of exchange 
rates. Exchange-rate  movements  can disrupt  price performance  just as 
commodity  inflation  due to, say, harvest  failures  can. The argument  that 
inventories  of commodities  should be established  and used to counter 
inflation  in the face of commodity  shocks has a precise analog  with re- 
spect to exchange  rates.35  In the face of exogenous  disturbances  to ex- 
change  rates, governments  should peg the rate and thus prevent  the in- 
flationary  impact from being built into commodity  prices, wages, and 
costs. This obviously assumes inventories  of foreign currencies  or the 
ability  to borrow. 
A third conclusion  concerns  policy in countries  that may not be able 
to finance the external deficit that a monetary-fiscal  policy expansion 
entails.  In the absence  of private  capital  flows,  the current-account  deficit 
arising  from the expansion  will sharply  depreciate  the currency.  In the 
absence  of reserves,  or an ability  of the private  sector to borrow  in the 
world  market,  public  borrowing  becomes  appropriate. 
The framework  suggests  that during  a world  recession  a synchronized 
expansion  is appropriate.  Small countries  cannot expand  by themselves 
because they may lack the reserves  or borrowing  ability  with which to 
maintain  exchange  rates. Unless large countries  are willing  to lend pub- 
34. A  similar argument has been made by Robert A. Mundell, The Dollar and 
the Policy Mix,  1971, Essays in International Finance 85  (Princeton University, 
International  Finance Section, 1971  ). 
35. The case for supply management through commodity inventories has been 
argued by Okun, "Inflation:  Its Mechanics and Welfare Costs," pp. 387-88; George 
L.  Perry, "Stabilization Policy  and Inflation," in  Henry  Owen and  Charles L. 
Schultze, eds., Setting National Priorities: The Next Ten Years (Brookings Institu- 
tion,  1976),  pp. 316-18;  and Richard N.  Cooper and Robert Z. Lawrence, "The 
1972-75 Commodity Boom," BPEA, 3:1975, pp. 671-715. Rudiger  Dornbusch  and Paul Krugman  575 
licly and thus finance  their expansion,  smaller  countries  confront  a par- 
ticularly  disadvantageous  tradeoff  between  inflation  and unemployment. 
Not only would an expansion  intensify  inflation,  but the induced  depre- 
ciation  would worsen  the terms  of trade  and thus lower the real income 
of those  already  employed. 
In contrast,  a world expansion  in aggregate  demand  would allow re- 
covery of employment  at constant exchange  rates and therefore  avoid 
the uncertainty  associated  with  the J-curve  and  the potentially  inflationary 
impact  of exchange-rate  movements.  In the current  recession,  large  coun- 
tries have espoused hard-money  philosophies  and have favored a very 
moderate  recovery.  They have benefited  in the foreign-exchange  market 
by appreciation  and an imported  dampening  of inflation. Soft-money 
countries,  by contrast,  have experienced  the corresponding  depreciation 
and thus have "imported"  inflation.  The virtuous  and vicious circle has 
operated  against  expansionary  countries.  With renewed concern about 
world aggregate  demand  and with ongoing  concern  about  high-inflation 
countries,  a look at coordinated  expansion  in the world economy is in 
order. Comments 
and  Discussion 
Richard  N. Cooper:  This  paper  is an extremely  useful  synthesis  of several 
strands of analytical  thought.  It integrates  the new emphasis  on asset 
pricing  and expectations  formation  in the exchange  market  with the old 
emphasis  on relative-price  effects  and  movements  in aggregate  output  and 
expenditure,  or absorption. 
As such, I think it represents  a very useful corrective  to new and im- 
portant lines of thinking  that otherwise  would neglect the older and 
equally  valid  analysis  in the short-term  time  frame.  That  horizon,  on which 
Dornbusch  and Krugman  focus in their paper, is the relevant  one for 
macroeconomic  stabilization  policy. 
The second half of the paper  does some relatively  primitive  empirical 
tests and finds  that for large  industrial  countries  (1)  a change  in the ex- 
change  rate affects  the terms  of trade;  (2)  a change  in the terms  of trade 
and hence  the exchange  rate  affects  trade  flows,  but only with  a lag; (3)  a 
change  in the terms  of trade  is affected  by-in  effect,  moderated  by-the 
pricing  of competitors  for all countries  except  the United  States;  and (4) 
a change in the exchange  rate affects domestic  prices directly,  without 
going  through  the goods market.  Since all of these empirical  results  were 
consistent  with  my priors,  following  a time-honored  practice  in economics 
I did not  look at the nature  of the tests  too closely. 
I thought  it would be useful, though,  to introduce  into the discussion 
some other empirical  results found by Ronald McKinnon,  by Robert 
Aliber,  and  by Stanley  Black,  which,  via a somewhat  different  route,  arrive 
at conclusions  for macroeconomic  policy that are very similar  to those 
of Dornbusch  and Krugman.  The other results attempt  to contrast  the 
experience  under  relatively  fixed  exchange  rates  before  March  1973, with 
the relatively  flexible  rates  since 1973. 
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We have now had about  three years of experience  with flexible  rates, 
and can begin  to ask how the two regimes  compare.  The first,  and again 
not entirely  surprising,  empirical  result  is that  bid-ask  spreads  on exchange 
rates-the  difference  between  the buying  and selling  price-widened, by 
a factor  of five  to ten, after  March  1973. 
Second,  the forward  exchange  rates do a very poor job of forecasting 
spot rates, and they do a worse job under flexible rates than they did 
under  fixed rates.  Under  flexible  rates  they have been strongly  biased as 
well as inaccurate  estimators.  This means  that  there  have  been substantial 
unexploited  possibilities  for speculative  profit. 
Third,  exchange-rate  movements  have done a poor job in the short  run 
-by  which I mean four to six quarters-of tracking  purchasing  power 
parity  between  countries.  Again  this  has been worse  in the last three  years 
than  before  that. 
The sharp  fall in the pound  in 1976, for example,  although  surprising 
to journalists,  should  not have surprised  anyone  who had looked at rela- 
tive-price-wage  comparisons.  What  was surprising  was that the value of 
the pound  stayed  as high  as it did  in 1973 and 1974 in the face of the  large 
inflation  differential  between  Britain  and  other  industrial  countries. 
These empirical  results  suggest  that expectations  about  exchange  rates 
are quite shallow, and are easily moved by relatively  ephemeral  events. 
Very  short-run  perceived  or actual  changes  in monetary  policies  exert  con- 
siderable  influence  on the exchange  rate. 
As Germany  and  the United  States  are  far and away  the biggest  trading 
countries,  and the mark  has now surpassed  the pound  as an international 
currency,  the mark-dollar  rate now represents  the key exchange  rate in 
the world.  This exchange  rate has moved up and down  by roughly  10 to 
15 percent  every  six months  and has shown  virtually  no trend  for the last 
three  years.  There  is something  to the argument  that  the markets  have  not 
really  adjusted  yet to the  new situation.  But I think  that  that  process  would 
and should  be helped  to some  extent  if the central  banks  were  more  active 
in exchange-market  intervention  than  they  have  been. 
By intervening  to stabilize  movements  in exchange  rates, the central 
banks  could actually  earn  profits,  but  that  is incidental.  The main  purpose 
is to smooth short-run  movements  without at the same time resisting 
longer-run  trends  which  are,  and  should  be, roughly  parallel  to movements 
in purchasing  power parity.  This is confirmed  by the main Dornbusch- 
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nomic  policy should  be exchange-market  intervention-which is another 
form  of monetary  policy-to  neutralize  any  random  disturbances  from  the 
exchange  rate. 
Let me conclude  by taking  up the paper's  argument  that the short-run 
Phillips  curve (loosely interpreted  to encompass  changes  in price levels 
as well as rates  of inflation)  associated  with  changes  in monetary  policy  is 
a lot steeper  with flexible  exchange  rates than it would  be with fixed ex- 
change  rates.  Obviously,  the more  open the economy  the more  force this 
point  has. That  section  of the paper  perhaps  suggests  an implicit  compari- 
son with a fixed-exchange-rate  regime  in which  open economies  have  less 
difficulty  with macroeconomic  management.  But extremely  open econ- 
omies have troubles  with  macroeconomic  management  under  either  fixed 
or flexible  rates.  As the authors  suggest,  flexible  rates  worsen  the Phillips 
tradeoff;  but  with  a fixed  exchange  rate,  monetary  policy  does not work  at 
all because  a dollar's  worth  of monetary  expansion  simply  escapes  to the 
rest of the world  and  is undone  through  exchange-market  intervention  by 
the central  bank. 
Even fiscal policy has only a small leverage  on domestic demand  if 
the marginal  propensity  to import  is very high. The case that Dornbusch 
and Krugman  make  for coordinated  macroeconomic  policy  under  flexible 
rates  applies  as well for small  countries  on fixed  rates.  They  are  much  bet- 
ter off if they  move together  than  if they act independently.  A really  open 
economy  is open  under  fixed  as well as flexible  rates. 
Marina  v. N. Whitman:  This  paper  is eclectic  in the  best sense  of the  word. 
Three approaches  to the analysis  of balance-of-payments  and exchange- 
rate adjustments-the asset-market,  the Keynesian,  and the purchasing- 
power  models-which were formerly  viewed as competing  explanations, 
have been synthesized  into a composite  theory  that comes closer to ex- 
plaining  real-world  phenomena  than  any  one of its components. 
Basically, Dornbusch  and Krugman  show that the asset-market  ap- 
proach,  which  stresses  the role of portfolio-balance  and  stock  adjustments 
in exchange-rate  determination,  yields the same result as the traditional 
Keynesian  model when the latter  incorporates  capital  mobility  (as in the 
Mundell-Fleming  version) as well as expectations,  and  downplays  the  role 
of current-account  adjustments  in the short  run. 
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are consistent  with common sense, but that seem to be denied by the 
simpler  versions  of theoretical  formulations  that have enjoyed  consider- 
able currency  lately: (1)  that, in a world  of capital  mobility,  flexible  ex- 
change  rates do not provide  full insulation,  even from purely  monetary 
disturbances;  and (2)  that there is nothing surprising  about short-run 
fluctuations  in exchange  rates  that are  much  larger  than  appear  to be war- 
ranted  by price-cost  divergences  among  countries  but that are  induced  by 
changes  in interest-rate  differentials. 
The empirical  evidence  presented  by Dornbusch  and  Krugman  has  three 
basic implications.  First, it gives considerable  support  to the Keynesian 
notion  that  exchange  rates  affect  relative  prices,  or the terms  of trade,  over 
a considerable  period. Second, relative  prices do affect trade flows, al- 
though  the lags involved  are long. Third,  along  with this confirmation  of 
Keynesian  conventional  wisdom,  however,  they caution  us (implicitly  if 
not explicitly) against overgeneralization.  Different  countries  seem to 
have had different  experiences.  On the one hand,  in the United  States  and 
Japan,  changes  in exchange  rates  were paralleled  by changes  in competi- 
tiveness, lending support  to the Keynesian  view. On the other, in the 
United Kingdom  and Germany,  exchange-rate  changes had very little 
effect  on competitiveness  because  they were offset  by relative  movements 
in domestic  rates  of inflation,  thus supporting  the monetarist  view. 
I found one thing missing  from the empirical  work in this paper: an 
examination  of the shift between  imports  and import substitutes  when 
the terms  of trade  change.  A theory  that  focuses  on relative-price  changes 
predicts  quantity  shifts  on both  the export  and  the  import  sides  in response 
to changes  in the terms  of trade.  But the empirical  evidence  in the paper  is 
limited  to exports  or, more  precisely,  export  shares. 
The analysis  has, I think, one general  problem.  It created  some con- 
fusion-on  the part  of the reader  if not on the part  of the authors-about 
the length of the period under  discussion.  The authors  characterize  the 
whole paper  as short-run  analysis,  but several  different  lengths  of run  are 
actually  involved in their composite adjustment  process. Their scheme 
implies  that, when some disturbance  affects  the exchange  market  in the 
short  run, asset markets  adjust  immediately.  The resulting  change  in the 
exchange  rate produces  a change  in relative  prices  or the terms  of trade. 
This subsequently  causes a change  in the current  account,  which is the 
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(something  like two to three  years). And then, presumably,  some inter- 
action  between  the exchange  rate  and  the domestic  price  level  restores  pur- 
chasing  power  parity  in the  long run. 
But I am a little uncertain  about that last step. The interactions  the 
authors  discuss are really quite short run, and it seems to me that the 
weakest  theoretical  link in the paper  is from the Keynesian  medium  run 
to long-run  purchasing  power parity. Presumably,  that adjustment  in- 
volves  more  than  the one-way  effect  of exchange  rates  on domestic  prices, 
which  is covered  in the paper.  The reverse  effects  of price  levels or infla- 
tion rates on the exchange  rate must enter into the process  for the long 
run. 
The analysis  leads to interesting  policy conclusions.  But it is striking 
that, at least in one respect,  the fundamentally  Keynesian  reasoning  leads 
to  a  supermonetarist  conclusion-that,  in open economies, monetary 
policy is ineffective  in altering  the level of real economic  activity,  even in 
the short  run. 
The authors  pose two major  policy dilemmas.  One is that exchange- 
rate fluctuations  that are excessive  in relation  to real divergences  in price 
levels-reflecting the more rapid  adjustment  of asset  markets  and slower 
adjustment  of the current  account-have a negative  impact  on economic 
welfare. 
One  solution  is direct  intervention  in the exchange  markets.  The authors 
draw an analogy  to the use of buffer  stocks to dampen  fluctuations  in 
commodity  markets.  But, as in the case of buffer  stocks, exchange-rate 
intervention  should  be symmetrical  with respect  to overshooting  and un- 
dershooting.  Yet the authors  seem to argue asymmetrically:  they urge 
countries  to intervene  to prevent  the exchange  rate  from rising (the cur- 
rency  from depreciating)  excessively  in the short  run,  but they don't  pre- 
scribe  for exchange  rates  that fall unduly  in the short  run.  If buffer  stocks 
are not managed  symmetrically,  they will either  become massive  or run 
out, and there  are analogous  problems  in exchange-rate  management-as 
the old fixed-rate  system  demonstrated. 
A second solution  to excessive  fluctuations  of exchange  rates invokes 
Mundell's  policy-mix  prescription  that directs  fiscal  policy  toward  domes- 
tic stabilization  and monetary  policy toward exchange-rate  constancy. 
The problem  here is that the little bit of empirical  evidence  I have seen 
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rates. The relationship  depends  on the nature  of the disturbance:  if a 
rise  in interest  rates  is due  to tight  money,  it will be associated  with  appre- 
ciation  of the currency;  but if it is due to a boom and a rise in inflationary 
expectations,  it will be associated  with a depreciation.  Furthermore,  the 
analysis allows for no responsiveness  of capital flows to real income 
growth.  I believe  that is an important  phenomenon  in the real world  and 
I wonder  how  it would  alter  the  policy  conclusions. 
Finally,  as a third  possible  solution,  the authors  suggest  policy  coordina- 
tion. That is something  we can all support,  but it is discussed  only by 
example  and not defined  rigorously. 
The second  big  policy  dilemma  the authors  pose  is the so-called  "vicious 
and virtuous  circle"-that is, the notion of improving  Phillips  curves  in 
countries  that  initially  have an inflation  performance  better  than  the aver- 
age, and  worsening  Phillips  curves  in countries  that  initially  have an espe- 
cially unfavorable  tradeoff. 
This  problem  begins  to push  us back  into  the world  of the disequilibrium 
system  that Mundell  described  under  fixed  rates,  and that we thought  we 
were escaping  by moving  to flexible  rates.  The authors  might,  with some 
justification,  argue  that this is a long-run  problem  and therefore  outside 
the purview  of this paper.  But the possibility  remains  that the operation 
of the exchange-rate  mechanism  they describe  for the short run might 
create  dynamic  instability  in the long run.  Hence  this very  useful  and  very 
informative  paper  leaves  me at the end with  a lingering  sense  of unease. 
General  Discussion 
Franco Modigliani  said that the most important  mechanism  brought 
out by the paper  was the way monetary  expansion  would alter  the price 
level via changes  in the exchange  rate. He felt that exchange-rate  move- 
ments due to interest-rate  differentials  ought  to be short-lived  and to be 
reflected  more in spot than in forward  rates. To the extent that these 
effects are perceived  as temporary,  the prices of imported  goods ought 
not to move much.  Modigliani  observed,  however,  that  if speculators  did 
not behave  to dampen  these changes,  a destabilizing  process  would  afflict 
the system.  He pointed  to the recent  debate  on the appropriate  policy for 
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to devalue  because  it does  not have  sufficient  reserves  to handle  the  J-curve 
effects.  This reasoning  implies  that speculators  do not perform  their re- 
quired  role. 
Dornbusch  and Krugman  expanded  on Cooper's  remark  that expecta- 
tions  have  been  extremely  volatile  and  that  the forward  rate  under  flexible 
exchange  rates  has  been both a poor and  a biased  predictor  of future  rates. 
William  Poole queried  Krugman  skeptically  on the nature  and conclu- 
siveness  of the statistical  tests  that  had yielded  those findings.  Dornbusch 
added  that the evidence  on the relationship  between  interest-rate  differ- 
entials and exchange-rate  changes was mixed, for the reasons Marina 
Whitman  had pointed out: exchange-rate  changes  between the United 
States  and  Germany  were  correlated  with  their  interest-rate  changes;  those 
between  the United  States  and  the United  Kingdom  were  not. 
Several  participants  were troubled  by the paper's  treatment  of the dis- 
tinction  between  exogenous  and endogenous  variables.  Poole pointed  out 
that  at times  the exchange  rate  was  spoken  of as exogenous;  at other  times, 
as was more appropriate  under  flexible  rates,  it was treated  as an endog- 
enous variable.  Poole felt that it was wrong  to refer  to an exchange-rate 
change as exogenous  without  describing  the prior disturbance  that had 
caused  the change-a  point, he noted, that Whitman  had made with re- 
spect to interest  rates. Others  identified  similar  problems  in the interpre- 
tation of the equations:  Stephen  Marston  noted that the chain of causa- 
tion might  run  from  inflation  via a depreciation  into import  prices  and  not 
vice versa (and that  this might  explain  the large  U.S. coefficient).  George 
Perry  suggested  that  the effect  of import  prices  on consumer  prices  in table 
3 would  be understated  if they influenced  wages  and hence standard  unit 
labor  costs of exported  products  and  import  substitutes.  Christopher  Sims 
pointed  out that  aggregate  demand  could influence  import  prices  and sug- 
gested  that tests for exogeneity  might  be undertaken.  In response,  Dorn- 
busch agreed  that one had to be very careful  in saying  why the exchange 
rate  moved,  but stressed  that,  in the short  run,  exchange  rates  are  far  more 
volatile  than  the inflation  rate and  have an impact  independent  of it. Paul 
Krugman  said  that  the failure  of exchange  rates  in the short  run  to follow 
purchasing  power  parity,  and the fact that  much  of the change  in import 
prices  was due to the commodity  boom and  the increase  in oil prices,  pro- 
vided  the rationale  for considering  import  prices  as predetermined. 
Walter  Salant  pointed  out that import  prices  might  also affect  the price 
level through  the direct  impact  on import-competing  goods, He felt that Rudiger  Dornbusch  and Paul Krugman  583 
this might  explain  the large  coefficient  on imports  in the U.S. price  equa- 
tion. Dornbusch  doubted  that this could be an inflationary  force without 
an increase  in aggregate  demand.  Salant  replied  that such demand  might 
be "prospective"  and Cooper cited some mixed evidence  on the effects 
of U.S. tariff  increases:  in some  cases,  domestic  producers  competing  with 
imports  marked  up their prices  immediately;  in other  cases they did not. 
Concurring  with Sims, Modigliani  observed  that demand  in the United 
States  might influence  import  prices. He also distinguished  between  the 
effects  of an increase  in the price of an imported  commodity  that might 
occur  because  prices  of a domestic  substitute  rose, and the larger  impact 
of a devaluation  that raised  the prices  of both imports  and import-com- 
peting goods. It was this latter  effect  that the authors  had appropriately 
captured  in their  regressions. 
Salant  felt that  too much  reliance  had been placed  upon  terms-of-trade 
effects.  Devaluation,  he pointed  out, can  work  without  changing  the terms 
of trade  by inducing  increased  supplies  of tradables  because  their  prices 
rise in domestic  currency  or by changing  the relative  price of traded  and 
nontraded  goods  or  both. 
Salant questioned  the use of bilateral  weights  in calculating  effective 
exchange  rates  because  these  are  inaccurate  indicators  of competitive  posi- 
tions in third  markets.  The yen would not be given much weight  in the 
effective  exchange  rate of the mark  because  there  is not much trade  be- 
tween Germany  and Japan.  But this might  be misleading  insofar  as both 
countries  compete  in other markets-for example,  the U.S. automobile 
market.  William  Fellner observed  that what was really required  was a 
model  that  determined  the weights  endogenously,  but  Krugman  and  Dorn- 
busch  noted that they had tried  a variety  of techniques  for weighting  ex- 
port shares and found the results  very insensitive  to the choice among 
weighting  procedures. 
Marston  asked  whether  it was appropriate  to introduce  the once-and- 
for-all  inflationary  impact  of a depreciation  into the Phillips  curve.  Dorn- 
busch  agreed  that a depreciation  might  have a once-and-for-all  effect,  but 
pointed  out that it might  well enter  into wages and produce  a continuing 
inflation.  Edmund  Phelps  was also puzzled  by the use of the  Phillips  curve 
in this context:  when the curve  is viewed  as a structural  relation  between 
the rate of change  of prices  and  unemployment,  why should  its shape  de- 
pend on the origin  of changes  in demand?  Dornbusch  replied  that,  for an 
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and the GNP deflator  is independent  of the sources  of demand,  that in- 
volving the consumer  price index would not be independent  since it re- 
flected  import  prices and hence the exchange  rate. Whitman  noted that 
even if the government  kept aggregate  demand  constant,  the consumer 
price  index  would  rise  if prices  of imported  goods  rose. 
The issues raised  in the paper  about  international  policy coordination 
also evoked several  comments.  Marston  was not convinced  of the neces- 
sity for coordinated  expansion  among  countries.  It seemed  quite  possible 
to him that,  knowing  what  fiscal-monetary  strategies  the others  were  pur- 
suing,  each country  might  have sufficient  instruments  to pick a policy  mix 
that  would achieve  its own targets  independently.  In that sense,  the inter- 
national problem was exchanging  full information  about independent 
actions  rather  than  coordinating  the actions.  Charles  Holt asked  about  the 
adequacy  of current  professional  knowledge  to achieve  international  co- 
ordination,  assuming  the countries  wanted  to coordinate.  Dornbusch  con- 
firmed  Holt's suspicions  that the quantitative  bases of knowledge  were 
weak.  If the questions  were  the effect  on the growth  rate  of West  Germany 
from adding  one point  to the growth  rate of the United  States,  Dornbusch 
knew  of two models  that  would  give answers  that  differ  by a factor  of ten. 
He insisted,  nonetheless,  that  knowledge  about  directions  and  rough  orders 
of magnitude  was sufficient  to support  preferences  for some policy mixes 
among  countries  over  others. 
Fellner noted that any coordination  among countries  required  some 
decision  on whether  the major  emphasis  was  for the  less inflationary  coun- 
tries  to expand  more  or for the more  inflationary  countries  to expand  less. 
That  decision  seemed  particularly  critical  in view of the  Dornbusch-Krug- 
man lesson that exceptionally  inflationary  countries  cannot take care of 
their international  problem  simply by allowing  their exchange  rates to 
fall. 